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The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB or 
Board) is to establish independence standards applicable to 
the audits of public entities in order to serve the public 
interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
the securities markets. While working concurrently on its 
project to establish a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence to serve as the foundation for principles-based 
independence standards, the Board is studying the 
independence concerns related to “Family Relationships 
Between the Auditor and the Audit Client.” The Board 
therefore requests and encourages your response on the 
enclosed Invitation to Comment, ITC 99-1.
The operating policies of the ISB are designed to permit timely, 
thorough, and open study of issues involving auditor 
independence and to encourage broad public participation in 
the process of establishing and improving independence 
standards. All of the ISB’s constituencies, including members 
of the public, are encouraged to express their views on matters 
under consideration in order to stimulate constructive public 
dialogue.
To further its goal of improving independence requirements, 
the Board is considering revising those requirements relating 
to family relationships. The primary purpose of these 
revisions, as more fully discussed herein, is to develop 
principles-based standards to better address the threats to 
auditor independence raised by family relationships, 
specifically focusing on circumstances where the Board 
believes the risk is highest - for those on the engagement team 
and others who are likely to be able to influence the 
engagement.
For comment purposes, a discussion of the subject and a 
"Family Relationships Proposal," which differs in some 
important respects from the present rules, are presented. Two
alternatives are presented within the Proposal, some key 
factors are discussed in paragraphs 12-16. and then a list of 
questions is presented seeking comment on a number of 
specific issues.
While the ISB welcomes comments and suggestions on any 
aspect of the Proposal or on other effects of family 
relationships on auditor independence, input specifically is 
being sought on the questions that appear at the end of this 
Invitation to Comment.
*****
Responses should be addressed to the Independence 
Standards Board, 6th Floor, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New 
York, NY 10036-8775, Attn: ITC 99-1. Responses also may be 
faxed to (212) 596-6137, or sent via e-mail to 
isb@cpaindependence.org (the subject line should refer to ITC 
99-1). Comments must be received by September 30, 1999.
All responses will be available for public inspection and 
copying for one year at the offices of the Independence 
Standards Board and at the library of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA") at Harborside 
Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, New Jersey.
Independence Standards Board
Invitation to Comment
Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client
Objective
1. To further its mission of establishing principles-based independence 
standards, the Independence Standards Board is seeking public comment 
on ITC 99-1, “Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit 
Client.” Constructive public dialogue to improve independence requirements 
is at the heart of the Board’s due process procedures and desire to promote 
investor confidence in the securities markets. Before proposing a standard 
on the independence ramifications of family relationships, the Board 
believes that the public should have an opportunity to comment on the 
subject in a broader context, and therefore prepared this Invitation to 
Comment. Public commentary can help guide the ISB in determining the 
direction and general magnitude of any changes needed in this area before it 
moves toward proposing a new standard.
Background
2. At its May 26, 1998 meeting, the Board authorized the ISB staff to draft a 
proposed standard, for public comment, on these issues, subject to review 
by a broad-based Task Force and a Board Oversight Task Force. At its 
January 8, 1999 meeting, a draft ED was proposed based on the “on the 
engagement” approach. The Board, however, concluded to consider 
alternatives other than those presented and to convert the document into an 
invitation to comment on such alternatives. The result is this document, 
which was discussed and approved for issuance at the June 25, 1999 Board 
meeting.
Applicability
3. Entities covered by these rules - The ISB is considering family relationship 
issues as they apply to audits of all entities subject to the auditor 
independence rules and regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Therefore, if the Board were later to issue an independence 
standard on family relationships, based on the following Proposal or on 
some other model, that future standard would apply to those audits.
4. "Employment" issues only addressed - This Proposal relates solely to the 
"employment" and related aspects of family relationships. All investment 
rules are being carried forward from previously existing guidance until the 
Board has the opportunity to consider the broader subject of financial 
interests in its entirety. However, the Board recognizes that some view 
employment at a client effectively as a form of financial interest in that 
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client, including an interest in continuing employment and compensation, 
and financial interests flowing from such employment share some of its 
independence ramifications. Furthermore, companies are increasingly using 
stock compensation plans as part of the package of benefits offered to 
employees. The Board, therefore, is raising questions as to whether its 
tentative separation of the independence implications of family employment 
relationships from financial interests resulting from such employment is 
appropriate.
5. In this connection, some believe a project on the impact of family 
relationships on independence which does not address the question of 
spousal participation in broad-based employee incentive programs (e.g., 
stock option plans and 401k programs invested in company stock) in 
situations where spousal employment is otherwise appropriate is 
incomplete. For example, a partner who does not provide any professional 
services to the client and is not otherwise in a position to influence the audit 
may have a spouse employed by a client where equity incentives would 
normally be a significant part of his or her compensation. If the current 
rules remain in effect, however, the spouse would either have to accept a 
lower, or different, compensation package (which may not be possible in 
some situations where companies require their employees to have a 
minimum investment), or find employment elsewhere. Others recognize the 
importance of this issue but believe it is only one aspect of the broader stock 
ownership issue, and that addressing this aspect in isolation could result in 
inconsistent and possibly confusing guidance.
6. Periods covered by these rules - The Proposal presented in this Invitation to 
Comment describes the nature and content of the proposed rules, but not 
the periods for which they would be applicable. Such periods would be 
discussed in an actual proposed standard.
Discussion
7. Existing rules - Both the AICPA and the SEC have independence restrictions 
on family relationships between the auditor and the audit client. The 
AICPA’s rules are located primarily in Ethics Interpretation 101-9, and the 
SEC’s are located primarily in Section 602.02.h of its Codification of 
Financial Reporting Policies. Importantly, both sets of rules are based on 
definitions of a “member” as to which the rules are applied, but these 
definitions differ somewhat. The SEC defines “member” as meaning, in 
addition to the firm itself: “all partners, shareholders, and other principals 
in the firm; any professional employee involved in providing any professional 
services to the person, its parents, subsidiaries, or other affiliates; and any 
professional employee having managerial responsibilities and located in the 
engagement office or other office of the firm which participates in a 
significant portion of the audit.” The principal difference from the AICPA 
requirements is the applicability of the SEC’s requirements to all firm 
employees that provide any professional services to the client, rather than 
being limited to those employees working on an engagement requiring 
independence. In addition, the categories of relatives to which the rules are 
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applied differ. (For example, the SEC includes certain brother-in-law/sister- 
in-law relationships not covered by the AICPA.) Where such differences 
exist, the SEC rules are more restrictive.
8. The SEC rules are applied to relatives in varying degrees depending on the 
closeness of the relationship. No financial interests or business 
relationships by an auditor's spouse or dependents are permitted with an 
audit client. In addition, these individuals cannot have jobs with an audit 
client which would give them the opportunity to mold the shape of the 
financial statements. (The AICPA uses the term “audit sensitive” as its 
measure in this area.) In the case of other close relatives of the auditor 
there would be a presumption of impairment of independence when they 
have material financial interests in, or have business relationships or hold 
important positions with a client (AICPA terminology - has a position of 
“significant influence”), although any such impairment might be mitigated 
when there is adequate geographical separation. These rules assume that 
investors would not have confidence in an audit when persons conducting 
the audit, or certain of their associates, have a personal or financial interest 
in seeing the audit client succeed and prosper.
9. Need for revision - The primary purpose of any revisions to be considered by 
the Board would be to review the effects family relationships have on the 
independence of an auditor, and to develop a standard better based in 
principles by identifying the independence threats raised by family 
relationships. Then the standard would more specifically focus on the 
circumstances where the Board believes the risks of those threats are 
highest. The Board assumes that this higher risk is likely to arise from 
personnel “on the engagement” team, including those who are likely to be 
able to influence the engagement. However, that assumption, as well as 
identifying at what level influencing the engagement occurs, are key issues 
in the Proposal and its related questions.
10. Importantly, as part of recent social changes in the work environment, 
instances of family relationship questions, and their importance, have 
increased. The significant and recent success of women in the work place 
and in financial positions in particular, and the proliferation of working 
spouses, have magnified the opportunity for such issues to arise. Further, 
mergers, both of clients and of accounting firms themselves, have created 
numerous and unexpected relationships. And new communication 
technologies have reduced the importance of geographic distance, both in 
family and business relationships. Given these developments, many believe 
that the current restrictions should be re-examined to assure that they are 
believed to be necessary to counter an independence threat. Similarly, the 
threats should be evaluated to determine whether additional restrictions are 
necessary in specific circumstances.
11. The threats - Family relationships between auditors and their clients raise 
sensitive, and uniquely personal, concerns. There are both financial and 
emotional ties, sometimes close enough, at least in appearance, to ascribe 
activity or ownership of a relative directly to the auditor. Specifically, the 
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concerns are that independence could be considered to be impaired by an 
auditor
• effectively auditing his own (family’s) work,
• having financial interests or other mutual interests m the outcome of 
the audit,
• conveying information to the client relative to compromise the firm's 
audit approach or ability to consult effectively, or
• receiving critical comments from the relative about an assigned staff 
person, the threat of which could weaken the staff person's 
effectiveness.
The following paragraphs highlight several family relationship key factors or 
criteria for consideration prior to analyzing the Proposal. Questions to be 
responded to appear at the end of the ITC.
12. Who is “the auditor” to whom the rules should be applied? - As mentioned 
in paragraph 7, present rules are based on the definition of a “member,” 
whereas the Proposal focuses on personnel on the “engagement team” 
(broadly defined to include those likely to. influence the engagement) versus 
those who are not. If the ability to influence the audit is to be a criterion, 
then it is necessary - and difficult - to define that group, likely starting with 
the “chain of command” concept, and considering whether partners and 
managerial employees in the engagement office should be included.
13. To which “relatives” should the rules be applied? - As referred to in 
paragraph 8, the current SEC rules state that the closeness of the family 
relationship is central to evaluating the threat. But who is a “close relative,” 
and where and on what basis should the lines be drawn?
14. Which jobs of the relatives should matter? - Alternative factors include: the 
absolute level of the position, the nature of the position
(financial/nonfinancial, or sensitive/able to influence the financial 
statements) and the relative level of responsibility (e.g., having significant 
influence over financial or operating matters, or at corporate versus at an 
insignificant subsidiary). And some argue that since an auditor "on the 
engagement" cannot also be employed by the client, neither should the 
auditor's spouse or dependent.
15. What “mitigating factors” could be considered? - How much can additional 
internal firm reviews or limitations/firewalls help, or having a different firm 
audit the subsidiary employing a relative? To what degree are the self­
monitoring procedures of the firms, and discussions with the audit 
committee helpful? How much consultation and “auditor judgment” is 
appropriate?
16. What are the effects of death of, or divorce by, a relative? - When a relative 
dies or is divorced, a question sometimes arises as to whether that event has 
any effect on the firm's independence. For example, if an audit partner's 
nearby sister dies, would firm independence be impaired if the former 
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brother-in-law (the deceased sister's husband) became CFO of a client? If 
the sister were still alive, independence would be impaired, but present rules 
do not address death or divorce. Some believe that death or divorce reduce, 
but may not eliminate, the existing family relationship with the remaining 
individuals, so no blanket exemption from the rules should be provided. 
However, the facts and circumstances of a particular case, after applying 
careful analysis and judgment, might present convincing evidence that a 
presumption of continuing independence impairment might be overcome. Is 
this judgment approach reasonable? Who should be able to make that 
judgment, and using what criteria? Should its use be expanded to cover 
other situations where the family relationship is strained and virtually non­
existent (e.g., where there has been a long-term family feud involving other 
than a spouse or dependent)?
7
Independence Standards Board
Invitation to Comment
Family Relationships Proposal
(Note: Terms appearing for the first time which are presented in bold type are 
defined in the Glossary at the Appendix.)
1. Threats to independence exist in situations involving family relationships 
where a reasonable investor (in possession of the relevant facts) would be 
concerned about the integrity and objectivity with which the audit was 
conducted, and therefore about the credibility of the underlying financial 
statements. For example, concern could exist that an auditor could be 
influenced, or would influence others, to accept inappropriate accounting, or 
ignore an error or issue an inappropriate report, in an effort to protect a 
relative’s position at or financial interest in a client. This behavior could be due 
to emotional or financial interest ties (such as inheritance) to a relative or to 
protect a relative of a colleague out of sympathy or fear of retribution.
2. This Proposal relates solely to the "employment" and related aspects of family 
relationships. All investment rules are being carried forward from previously 
existing guidance until the Board has the opportunity to consider the subject of 
financial interests in its entirety.
3. Each firm has overall responsibility for its independence. Accordingly, 
through written policies and procedures, education courses and other 
appropriate forms of communication, each firm should stress to all its partners 
and staff that it is their individual professional responsibility to identify, 
evaluate and resolve (through discussions with appropriate persons in the firm) 
family relationship independence issues. Each firm should implement an 
identification and notification system that will provide reasonable assurance, 
under the facts and circumstances, that appropriate individuals in the firm 
(generally management and independence technical specialists) are advised of 
family relationships. It is important that firm leadership properly convey and 
enforce the policy that the firm and all its partners and staff are required to act 
at all times with integrity, independence and objectivity.
4. In addition, firms should implement the following controls:
• Consultation - Each firm should establish procedures requiring consultation 
with independence and other technical specialists regarding the closeness of 
the family relationship, the importance of the roles of both the individual 
and the relative, the degree of threat involved, and the safeguards available. 
Firms should have explicit written policies to provide guidance for such 
consultations.
• Recusal - Each firm should establish procedures, including recusal, to 
effectively isolate the individual having the relationship issue from any 
involvement with the client, including inappropriate contact with any 
individuals involved in the engagement.
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• Disclosure to the Audit Committee - Consistent with ISB Independence 
Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees, each 
firm should disclose relevant family relationships to appropriate client 
management and the audit committee and discuss the possible implications 
with them.
5. Certain family relationships arising with respect to partners or staff who are 
on an engagement are by their nature such that firm independence would be 
impaired despite any procedures or mitigating controls that could be put in 
place. Specifically, a firm will not be considered independent if, with respect to 
any firm partner or staff member on the engagement:
• an immediate family member were an employee of the client or has any 
investments with the client or with someone in a key position with the 
client; or
• a close relative other than an immediate family member is in a key position 
with the client or has any material investment with the client or with 
someone in a key position with the client.
6. In addition, certain family investments with respect to partners or staff not 
on the engagement also cause the firm’s independence to be impaired. 
Specifically, with respect to individuals not on the engagement, a firm will not 
be considered independent if a member of the immediate family of any firm 
partner, or of a managerial employee in an office participating in a significant 
portion of the audit, has any investment with a client, or with someone in a key 
position at a client.
7. Other family relationships beyond those restricted above may, under 
appropriate circumstances, be resolved with adequate mitigating controls 
including those discussed in paragraph 4 above. The following are examples of 
relationships of such individuals that are presumed to require a formal 
evaluation of the threats and mitigating safeguards, and appropriate formal 
resolution, by the firm:
• For firm partners or staff on the engagement:
A relative other than a close relative is in a key position at a client.
• For firm partners and staff not on the engagement:
A close relative is in a key position at a client, or
An immediate family member has a material investment with the client or 
with someone in a key position at the client.
8. Notwithstanding the above, the firm would not be independent of a client if a 
close relative of any firm partner or immediate family member of any staff 
member has direct or indirect control of that client.
9. Other than as to immediate family, the facts of the relative’s investments 
with a client are based upon the best knowledge of the firm and the individual 
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partner or staff member and it is presumed that the firm, and the partner or 
staff member, will be aware of widely-known public information.
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Appendix
GLOSSARY
This appendix contains definitions of terms or phrases used in this Proposal.
Close relative
Member of the immediate family, nondependent child, parent or sibling 
and their respective spouses, spouse’s parent, child, or sibling and their 
respective spouses, and grandparents and grandchildren of the member 
and spouse.
Immediate family member
Spouse, co-habitant, and dependents.
Key position
The individuals performing in the following roles for a client: director, 
underwriter, promoter, voting trustee, officer or employee in a sensitive 
financial position, or with significant influence over financial or operating 
matters, or other individuals with comparable responsibilities.
Managerial employee
A staff member in a position having continuing managerial responsibility 
for the overall planning and supervision of engagements for specified 
clients, or authority to determine that an engagement is complete subject 
to final partner approval if required, or responsibility for client 
relationships, or overall management of the firm, or development or 
implementation of, or compliance with, firm policies on technical matters 
including quality control.
On an engagement
Any partner or staff member who is directly involved with providing any 
professional services to the client, as well as those likely to influence the 
audit. Those likely to influence the audit are
• Alternative A - those who supervise or provide technical consultation, 
quality control or other oversight of the partners and staff members 
involved in the audit. In determining whether an individual meets 
one of these criteria, firms must be sensitive to their immediate 
practice environment. For example, in a small office, practice unit or 
firm, all partners might be considered as likely to influence the audit, 
even if in an informal manner.
• Alternative B -those partners and managerial employees in an office 
that performs a significant portion of the audit work, and also those 
persons who supervise or perform technical consultation, quality 
control or other oversight of the partners and staff members involved 
in the audit.
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Independence Standards Board
Invitation to Comment
Questions for which Comments are Requested
1. The Proposal makes a basic distinction between audit firm personnel “on an 
engagement” (broadly defined), and those who are uninvolved, when 
determining how family relationships affect auditor independence. Current 
SEC rules instead distinguish between “members” (defined as all partners, 
all managerial employees in offices performing a significant portion of the 
audit, and all individuals providing professional services to a client) and 
non-members in judging auditor independence. While the Proposal would 
limit the most stringent restrictions to those “on the engagement” - generally 
a smaller group than those considered “members” - it would strengthen the 
restrictions that apply to this group (by prohibiting any employment by the 
client, as discussed further in Question 6), as these individuals are in the 
best position to influence the outcome of the audit. Do you believe these 
changes are warranted?
2. A. The definition in the Appendix of “on an engagement” includes those who 
are “likely to influence the audit” and is very important in applying the rule, 
and therefore merits significant consideration. Alternative B, while less 
inclusive than the existing rules, includes in its scope many partners and 
managerial employees of the work office not envisioned in Alternative A. For 
example. Alternative B would prohibit a partner whose spouse is CFO of an 
audit client being in an office performing a significant portion of that client's 
audit engagement, whereas Alternative A would instead require the firm to 
assess the likelihood of the partner who is the CFO's spouse influencing the 
audit and, if that did not result in prohibition, then to rely on the 
consultation, recusal, disclosure and other controls described in paragraph 
4 of the Proposal. Do you believe that the added protection of independence 
provided by Alternative B’s covering this group is sufficient to warrant that 
extension, and if so, why?
B. If you support Alternative B, how would "an office" be defined, 
considering that a firm might have several locations in or around a large 
city? Does it matter if the “office” is managed on a “service-line” or an 
“industry” rather than a “geographic” basis?
C. If you instead prefer Alternative A, it suggests that all partners in a small 
office or practice unit might be considered as being likely to influence the 
audit. Do you believe that approach provides appropriate guidance? Would 
it be effective instead to isolate partners or to require additional reviews in 
these circumstances, or must audits of the companies with the family 
relationships just be avoided?
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3. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ITC describe the inter-relationship of a relative's 
employment by a client and the financial interests that flow from that 
employment. The Board, however, has tentatively chosen to defer 
consideration of job-related financial interests of relatives until the broader 
subject of financial interests can be reconsidered in its entirety. The basis 
for this tentative decision is that the question of permissible financial 
interests in a client is a major subject in its own right and has aspects 
broader than those of this project. Further, it is likely that resolution of that 
topic could benefit from the conclusions of the Board's in-process 
Conceptual Framework project.
The Board therefore asks whether a resolution of the employment issues 
raised in this Invitation to Comment, without dealing with the explicit 
financial interests that may come with that employment, will provide useful 
guidance. Alternatively, you may want to encourage the Board to expand 
the project, recognizing that doing so could delay issuance of any standard - 
and, of course, with no commitment as to how the Board would decide on 
such issues. Are the issues sufficiently different that the Board should now 
take up employment-related financial interests separately from other 
financial interests? Please describe the reasons for your conclusions.
4. “Close relative” is defined in the Appendix. Is that definition comprehensive 
enough, or too comprehensive?
5. Do you believe the definition of the term "key position" (with a client) is 
appropriate? If not, what would you change?
6. Under the Proposal’s paragraph 5, the immediate family of those on the 
engagement would not be permitted to have any employment by the client. 
Under existing rules, employment of an immediate family member is 
permitted unless the position is either audit sensitive or capable of molding 
the financial statements. Would it be appropriate to prohibit nonsensitive 
jobs based upon a premise that if the job is not appropriate for the auditor, 
then it also should not be appropriate for the spouse? While all those who 
provide any professional service to the client are defined to be "on the 
engagement," some would suggest that it would be adequate for this extra 
prohibition of any employment at the client to be limited to just those who 
provide audit (attest) services. What are your views and why? (Note that the 
impact of any conclusion could vary significantly depending on your view as 
to Question 2A.)
7. Paragraph 7 of the Proposal provides guidance on when formal firm 
consultation might be presumed for family relationship situations. Do you 
believe this guidance is appropriate, and that the examples are helpful 
instances of when such consulting should occur? Are there other examples 
you believe should be included?
8. A. Some believe that when certain family relationships exist at a client’s 
subsidiary level, a significant safeguard can be provided by having a 
different accounting firm audit that subsidiary. This potential safeguard 
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has not been described in the Proposal. Should the Proposal refer to this 
possible safeguard and, if so, how? For example, should that safeguard just 
be among those to be considered in the firm’s overall evaluation of the family 
relationship or, in certain fact patterns, should its use be permitted to 
overcome an otherwise required prohibition? If the use of a separate auditor 
should overcome an otherwise prohibition, under what criteria should that 
occur (e.g., only for immaterial subsidiaries, or certain material ones as 
well)?
B. Of how much help are the other safeguards, or "mitigating factors," 
described in paragraph 15 of the ITC? Are there additional safeguards 
which you believe are important?
9. Paragraph 16 of the ITC discusses “the effects of death of, or divorce by, a 
relative,” although these events are not currently mentioned in the Proposal. 
Should the Proposal be expanded to provide guidance in such situations? If 
so, what positions should that guidance take? If not, why not?
10. Are there other broad family relationship models, or other key criteria and 
factors for evaluating relationships, which the Board should consider?
11. Is there research that the Board should be made aware of or should sponsor 
to assist it in making informed judgments in these areas? If so, please offer 
recommendations.
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ISB SEEKS COMMENT ON PROPOSAL 
REGARDING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
Also Approves Practice Structure Discussion Memorandum 
and Development of an Exposure Draft on Mutual Funds
New York, NY (June 25, 1999) - The Independence Standards Board today cleared a 
ninety-day comment period on a proposal to revise rules concerning independent auditors 
with family members who are employed by clients.
The Invitation to Comment, Independence and Family Relationships, reflects the 
Board's preliminary judgment that the greatest threats to independence posed by 
relationships are those with persons who are directly able to influence the outcome of the 
audit.
"The thrust of the proposal is to impose the stiffest restrictions on those serving 
on the engagement team," said William T. Allen, ISB Chairman. "The current proposal 
would prohibit any employment by the client of a spouse or dependents of a member of 
the engagement team. However, it would be less restrictive for partners and others who 
aren't on the team, based on one tentative view that doing so would not adversely affect 
the firm's independence."
In other business, the Board approved, subject to certain changes, a Discussion 
Memorandum on practice structures. The DM, Evolving Forms of Firm Organization 
and Structure, investigates such issues as the independence implications of corporations 
buying the non-attest functions of accounting firms. The Discussion Memorandum will 
be issued in July for a sixty-day comment period.
The Board also authorized the development of an Exposure Draft on certain issues 
concerning auditor independence and mutual funds. The Exposure Draft is expected to 
be issued during the summer for a sixty-day comment period.
The Independence Standards Board is a private standard-setting body established 
in 1997 as the result of an agreement between the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and the Security and Exchange Commission. However, it operates 
independently of either body. Its mission is to develop concepts, principles and standards 
that ensure independence of auditors of public companies. It is headquartered in New 
York.
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